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Abstract
In March 2013 the Indonesian Parliament passed the Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism 
Financing Act (Law No.9 2013). Enactment of the legislation ostensibly brought Indonesia into 
line with its commitments under international law as a signatory to the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (1999) which Indonesia signed in September 2001 
and ratified in 2006. While Indonesia’s existing, hastily-drafted anti-terrorism legislation (Law No.15 
2003) contained a brief provision criminalising the funding of terrorism, this latest and much more 
significant statute is intended to shore up any gaps within the legislative regime already in place. It 
also provides for a central governmental agency, namely the Centre for Financial Transactions and 
Reporting (PPATK – Pusat Pelaporan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan), to have both authority and 
responsibility for the monitoring of suspicious financial transactions. While the legislation establishes 
the legal basis for PPATK’s role in countering the financing of terrorism, it also places significant 
obligations on financial services providers to monitor and report any suspicious transactions to 
PPATK – as well as obligations to “know your customer” – with significant penalty provisions for 
failure to do so. However, despite the enactment of this latest legislation to counter the funding of 
terrorism, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental standard-setting agency 
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), has 
kept Indonesia on its list of ‘high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’. This paper examines the 
international law background to the new counter-terrorism financing legislation, the substantive 
sections of the Act, and the obligations it places on commercial financial services providers. It also 
examines the legislative regime’s deficiencies and criticisms. 
Keywords: Transnational Organized Crime,Terrorism,Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism 
Financing Act 
I. INTRODUCTION
On 13 March 2013, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, and Minister for Law and Human Rights Amir Syamsudin 
signed into existence the Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism 
Financing Act (Law Number 9 of 2013) (Undang-undang Pencega-
han dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pendanaan Terorisme 2013) 
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(hereinafter the “Act”). At 49 pages, including explanatory notes, 
the Act is a substantial yet economically-worded piece of legislative 
drafting. The Act represents Indonesia’s visible, legislative commitment 
to the principles of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Financing of Terrorism 1999 (hereinafter the “Convention”), 
and the complementary special recommendations of the OECD’s 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Despite the enactment of this 
‘comprehensive’ legislation for countering the financing of terrorism1 
(otherwise generally known as “CFT” legislation), FATF in June 2013 
publicly acknowledged that Indonesia had made some progress to give 
effect to its obligations under the Convention, but continued to include 
Indonesia on its list of ‘high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’ 
(FATF 2012, pp. 31-2; 2013a). It noted that Indonesia had “not made 
sufficient progress in implementing its action plan within the agreed 
timelines” and that “certain strategic AML/CFT2 deficiencies remain 
regarding the establishment and implementation of an adequate legal 
framework and procedures for identifying and freezing of terrorist 
assets” (FATF 2013a, p. 3).
This paper examines Indonesia’s enactment in 2013 of its new 
law for the countering of the financing of terrorism, taking account of 
the various international conventions and United Nations resolutions 
which gave impetus to the Act’s emergence. It locates the Act within 
Indonesia’s counter terrorism legislative framework and considers 
whether the salient features of the new law appropriately meet the 
Act’s objectives, particularly in view of the FATF’s ongoing criticism 
of Indonesia’s performance in this regard. The paper argues that the 
Act is a commendable and timely attempt to monitor and eradicate 
funding of terrorism activities, its implementation falls somewhat short 
of those established international standards and conventions, as well as 
Indonesian domestic imperatives.
While CFT has not been a central element in Indonesia’s counter 
terrorism operations to date, globally, CFT has been of key importance 
in the war on terror and the prevention of terrorist attacks. As Barrett 
1  In this paper FATF usage of the acronym ‘CFT’ is followed, namely, ‘countering 
the financing of terrorism’.The acronym CTF “counter-terrorism financing” is also 
commonly seen in discussions of this topic. 
2  “AML/CFT” – Anti-money laundering/countering financing of terrorism
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notes, the last major bomb attack on a western country were the London 
bombings of 20053. He points out that: 
Ten years after 9/11 it is inconceivable that any terrorist group, 
let alone one connected to al-Qaeda, could raise enough money 
to launch an attack on a similar scale through donations. Given 
the scrutiny of and visibility of transactions in the formal banking 
system any financier of terrorism would take a huge risk were he to 
transfer money to a known terrorist entity. (Barrett 2012, p. 719)
Countering the financing of terrorism s therefore of key importance 
in combating terrorism per se. CFT laws are potentially an extremely 
powerful weapon in the hands of law enforcement agencies to disable 
terrorist groups and individuals. They can prevent terrorist attacks by 
cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist groups – depriving them of 
resources needed to purchase weapons, for example. But CFT laws also 
function by criminalising the act of funding terrorism, so that persons or 
organisations knowingly providing any kind of funds for a terrorist act, 
individual or group, are committing a crime - even when they had no 
intention of taking part in an actual terrorist attack themselves. CFT laws 
also expose “money trails” which may generate previously unknown 
leads, and which can force terrorists to use more costly and high risk 
means of funding their activities – making them more susceptible to 
detection. (FATF 2013b)
Terrorism, and by necessity the funding of terrorism, are still live 
and serious issues in Indonesia. While there have been no major bomb 
attacks on foreign targets since 2009, low level violence primarily 
between terrorist groups and the police continues – four police officers 
were killed by suspected terrorists in the month of August 2013 alone 
(Meida 2013). During the writing of this paper another police officer 
was fatally shot in Central Jakarta (Marhaenjati 2013). And the threat 
of a major bomb attack remains –in August, a bomb exploded in a 
Jakarta Buddhist temple injuring three people; the attack was allegedly 
in response to violence against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar 
(Natahadibrata 2013; Sandro Gatra 2013). Terrorist cells have shown 
3  Barrett’s article was written in 2012, before the Boston marathon bombing of April 
2013. With three fatalities and 264 injured it is arguably a major bombing, however it 
is clearly not on the same scale as the 9/11 attacks.
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remarkable resilience and ingenuity, in respect of their funding efforts. 
Groups have resorted to many forms of crime to fund their activities, 
including bank robbery, motorcycle and jewellery theft, smuggling, 
narcotics trading, posing as mobile phone-card agents, and even 
operating businesses under the guise of corporate social responsibility 
or welfare activities (Globe 2012; ICG 2012). Most recently, internet 
fraud has emerged as potentially a major source of funds. In May 2012, 
the head of the National Counter-terrorism Agency, Ansyaad Mbai, 
commented that counter-terrorism officers had arrested 11 suspects 
who had hacked into multi-level marketing websites and stole over Rp8 
billion (over US$800,000) to fund terrorist training camps, and purchase 
explosive materials (Globe 2012). It should be noted that Indonesian 
terrorist groups have not yet resorted to kidnapping for ransom as a 
source of funds, a common practice among African terrorist groups. 
Clearly therefore, an effective CFT regime is urgently needed in Indo-
nesia. However, to function effectively as a method of law enforcement 
a CFT regime requires the knowledge and cooperation of government 
departments, law enforcement agencies and private financial institutions. 
It is therefore essential for all parties to be aware of, and implement these 
CFT laws – not only for the common good of fighting and preventing 
terrorist violence. All financial services providers operating in Indonesia, 
both formal and informal, are subject to this legislation – and it contains 
substantial penalties for non-compliance. For example, Article 13 of the 
Act provides that a financial service provider which fails to report a ‘sus-
picious transaction’ to PPATK within three days of becoming aware of 
it, faces a penalty of up to Rp1 billion (approximately US$100,000). It is 
therefore essential for any provider operating within Indonesia to be fully 
aware of their obligations under the Act. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW BACKGROUND
In her analysis of CFT, McGarritty argues that the international counter-
terrorism financing regime “can best be described as a ‘patchwork’ of 
international instruments. Whilst each of these instruments requires states 
to criminalise the financing of terrorism, there are important points of 
distinction in the detail” (McGarrity 2013, p. 55).
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The international law response to terrorism and terrorism financing 
goes back well before the terrorist attacks on New York’s World Trade 
Centre of 9 September 2001 (universally recognised as the most 
egregious of terrorist attacks and simply known as “9/11”). For example, 
the United Nations (UN), an organisation founded on the highest 
principles of peace, justice, human rights and friendly relations between 
states, has, for decades, condemned acts of aggression and terrorism by 
both states and non-state actors. General Assembly Resolution 2625 
(XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States of October 1970 
(UN 1970) and General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII) Measures 
to Prevent International Terrorism of December 1972 (UN 1972) both 
condemn terrorist acts without prescribing clearly and unequivocally 
what constitutes terrorism. Resolution 3034 Article 4, for example, 
“condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, 
racist and alien regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to 
self-determination and independence and other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”.
Twenty years later, General Assembly Resolution 46/51 Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism of December 1991 (UN 1991) recalls 
no less than nine of its resolutions and declarations from the 1970s and 
1980s. The Preamble again expresses the UN’s deep disturbance at “the 
world-wide persistence of acts of terrorism in all its forms … including 
those in which States are directly or indirectly involved”.
General Assembly Resolution 49/60 Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism of December 1994 (UN 1994) contains the first 
specific reference to the act of financing of terrorism. Reminiscent of 
the wording of Resolutions 2625 (XXV) of October 1970 and 46/51 of 
December 1991, Resolution 49/60 once again recalls the growing list 
of resolutions, declarations, treaties and conventions4 on terrorism, and 
4  Resolution 49/60 Preamble recalls that “the existing international treaties relat-
ing to various aspects of the problem of international terrorism [include], inter alia, 
the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion 1971, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against In-
ternationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973, the International 
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condemns all acts of international terrorism. An important difference, 
however, is the inclusion of the crucial term “financing” in its language. 
Article 5(a) of the Resolution calls on states to “refrain from organizing, 
instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist 
activities” within their respective territories (emphasis added). 
But, as McGarritty points out, “a substantial portion of the funds 
used for terrorist activities is now provided by private individuals and 
organisations rather than states” (McGarrity 2013, p. 57). General 
Assembly Resolution 51/210 Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism of December 1996 (UN 1996), recognises this weakness 
and, stressing the need for international and regional cooperation, 
specifically calls upon States, at paragraph 3(f):
To take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate do-
mestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations, 
whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which 
also have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which 
are also engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, 
drug dealing and racketeering, including the exploitation of persons for 
purposes of funding terrorist activities
Paragraph 3(f) continues:
and in particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory 
measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected 
to be intended for terrorist purposes without impeding the freedom 
of legitimate capital movements. (UN 1996, p. 3(f))
Importantly, paragraph 9 establishes an ad hoc committee to 
develop a “comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with 
international terrorism.” (UN 1996, p. 5 Para 9) While work on this 
comprehensive framework is ongoing, importantly for this discussion, 
the ad hoc committee’s deliberations led to the creation and adoption 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979, the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material 1980, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation 1988, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 1988, and the Conven-
tion on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991.”
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by the General Assembly, by Resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999 
(UN 1999a), of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism (the “Convention”). As later discussed, the 
Convention (along with FATF recommendations) provides the legal 
framework and principles upon which Indonesia’s domestic legislation 
is based. Indeed, several of the provisions in the domestic legislation 
mirror key articles of the Convention.
Firstly, Convention article 1(1) provides a very broad definition 
of “funds” which includes “assets of every kind whether tangible or 
intangible, moveable or immoveable, however acquired, and legal 
documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, 
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited 
to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, 
securities, bonds, drafts and letters of credit.”
Secondly, it sets out a definition of a ‘terrorist act’ and criminalises 
financial support for that act. Given that defining terrorism has been 
described as “a futile polemical exercise” and “the Bermuda Triangle 
of terrorism” (Schmid 2011, p. 42), this is a significant achievement – 
even if the definition is only for the limited purposes of the CFT regime 
in the Convention. Article 2(1) creates an offence for any person who, 
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully provides or collects funds 
with the intention that they should be used in full or in part in order to 
carry out: 
(a) An act defined in one of the treaties listed in the Annex5, or:
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to 
5  The nine conventions listed in the Convention Annex include the following:
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973; International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages, 1979; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
1980; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988; Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on 
the Continental Shelf, 1988; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, 1997.
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a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of 
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.
Article 2(1)(a) above may be problematic as it depends on which 
of the twelve terrorism conventions a state has ratified. Article 2(1)(b) 
rectifies this to some extent by effectively providing a working defini-
tion of a terrorist act – in a nutshell, any act intended to cause death or 
serious injury to civilians with the purpose of creating fear or coercing a 
government. Article 2(3) establishes that it is not necessary for the funds 
to actually have been used to carry out a terrorist act. Articles 2(4) and 
2(5) create additional offences for those who attempt, participate as an 
accomplice, organize or direct others, or contribute to the commission 
of an offence under Article 2(1) – that is, inchoate offences.
The Convention further requires, pursuant to Article 4, that State 
Parties create criminal offences (with corresponding penalties that 
reflect the seriousness of the offences) in their domestic law based on 
the offences set forth in Article 2. Further, the offences must also apply 
to “legal entities” which commit the offences, and extra-territoriality 
provisions must be applied as well. For example, where an offence 
is committed on board a ship flying the flag of the state, or where a 
national of that state commits a terrorist act in another country, that 
state may establish jurisdiction to prosecute the offence. 
State Parties are also required to take measures to provide for the 
freezing, seizure and forfeiture of funds allocated for terrorist acts 
(article 8), and to prosecute or extradite, where they become aware 
that an offender is within their jurisdiction (articles 9 and 10). The 
offences set out in Article 2 are expressly extraditable offences, and 
the Convention stresses the need for international cooperation in the 
investigation and prosecution of offenders. 
Convention article 18 stipulates the obligations and regulations to be 
applied to financial institutions such as identification of customers and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions. As discussed later, these principles 
are enunciated in more detail in FATF’s Special Recommendations. 
It is interesting to note that the Convention opened for signature from 
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10 January 2000 until 31 December 2001 (Article 25.1), and required 
22 ratifications to enter into force (Article 26). But by early September 
2001, it had been ratified by only four states. However, following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and UN Resolution 1373, the Convention was 
rapidly ratified by many states and came into force on 10 April 2002. 
Indonesia signed the Convention on 24 September 2001 (Husein 2012, 
p. 15) and ratified it by Act of Parliament in 2006 (Undang-undang 
Nomor 6 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pengesahan International Treaty for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 2006).
In considering the UN response to CFT, two Security Council 
resolutions are of particular significance, namely Resolution 1267 of 
1999 (UN 1999b) and Resolution 1373 of 2001 (UN 2001). Resolution 
1267 was aimed specifically at disabling the Taliban, and Al Qaida, 
and required states to freeze any funds connected to the Taliban. It 
also established the “1267 Committee”, tasked with creating a list of 
individuals and organisations associated with Al Qaida, for whom states 
are required to freeze their assets “without delay”. The list contains 
several Indonesian nationals and organisations including Abu Bakar 
Bashir, Umar Patek and the Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) amongst 
others (UN 2013). As discussed later, the implementation of this list and 
the significance of freezing of assets “without delay” is one of the main 
stumbling blocks faced by Indonesia. 
Resolution 1373 was issued on 28 September 2001, just over two 
weeks after 9/11, and is broader in its application than Resolution 1267. 
Amongst other provisions, it “decided” that all states shall “prevent and 
suppress the financing of terrorist acts” by criminalising the provision or 
collection of funds for terrorism and by freezing funds of persons who 
commit terrorist acts. Broadly speaking, the obligations of Resolution 
1373 are similar to those under the Convention with one major exception 
– the Convention defines a terrorist act. This may be one reason why 
under Article 3(d) States are called upon to “become parties as soon 
as possible to the relevant international conventions...including the 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999” 
(UN 2001, p. 3 Para d).
While there are considerable overlaps between the Convention 
and Resolution 1373, together they form a much stronger and more 
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comprehensive CFT regime. For example, the Convention contains 
provision for preventative mechanisms - such as customer identification 
and reporting of suspicious transactions - that are not mentioned in 
Resolution 1373. On the other hand, Resolution 1373 creates the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee which is specifically tasked with pursuing 
implementation by various State Parties of the Resolution and Convention 
provisions. Resolution 1373 also provides that in respect of terrorist 
groups not linked to Al Qaida or the Taliban, states will be responsible for 
compiling their own domestic lists of terrorist individuals or organisations 
– and consequently freezing their assets. The compilation of this domestic 
list has also been flagged by the FATF as an issue in Indonesia’s non-
compliance with its international obligations.
Outside the UN arena, FATF has had a significant impact on the 
introduction of CFT laws. Established in 1989 under the auspices 
of the OECD, FATF’s original mandate was to examine issues of 
combating international money laundering. However, following 9/11 
it expanded its role to include CFT; since then it has issued IX Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (FATF 2008). As Realuyo 
notes, while FATF’s recommendations are non-binding, inclusion on 
its list of non-compliant countries may have serious consequences for 
a country’s ability “to do business in the international financial system 
and discourage investors from engaging in a country” (Realuyo 2013, 
p. 15). This ‘name and shame’ process has been extremely effective in 
bringing countries into line with international standards on both AML 
and CFT. Indeed, a prominent Indonesian lawmaker and politician, 
Eva Kusuma Sundari, criticized the Act, arguing that its introduction 
“was mainly triggered by the critical report of the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) on Indonesia” (Tas 2012).
FATF’s IX Special Recommendations mirror the Convention, in that 
they direct states to ratify the Convention, criminalise acts of terrorist 
financing, freeze assets, report suspicious transactions and cooperate 
internationally. But Recommendations VI, VII, VIII and IX add detail 
relating to issues of alternative remittances, wire transfers, non-profit 
organisations and cash couriers – all areas on which the Convention 
remains silent. 
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III. THE INDONESIAN CFT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
While there has been much international academic literature de-
voted to global terrorism issues, very little has focused on Indonesia’s 
domestic anti-terrorism legislation, and even less on its CFT laws. This 
is no doubt due to the fact that the comprehensive counter terrorism 
financing legislation was only recently enacted in March, 2013. How-
ever, this is only part of the story. While it can now be said that Indone-
sia’s domestic legislation is largely, if not completely, compliant with 
the provisions of the Convention and the FATF IX Special Recommen-
dations, that was not the case beforehand. 
Following is a timeline of Indonesia’s evolving CFT legislative re-
gime:
1. 9 December 1999 – The UN issues the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (the Convention) by 
Resolution 54/109.
2. 24 September 2001 – following 9/11 , Indonesia signs the 
Convention.
3. 28 September 2001 – UN Security Council Resolution 1373 is 
issued requiring all states to criminalise the financing of terrorism, 
and calling on them to ratify the Convention “as soon as possible”.
4. 18 October 2002 – following the Bali bombing of 12 October, 
Indonesia issues Interim Law Number 1 of 2002(PERPU Nomor 
1 2002 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme 2002), 
criminalising the financing of terrorism. This interim law was 
ratified by Act of Parliament in March 2003 by Law No. 15 2003. 
(Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan 
PERPU Nomor 1 2002 Tentang Pemberantasan Terorisme, Menjadi 
Undung-Undang 2003) 
5. 5 April 2006 – Indonesia ratifies the Convention with Law Number 6 
of 2006 (Undang-undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pengesahan 
International Treaty for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 1999 2006). It states that, with one reservation, the 
Convention forms an inseparable part of the law itself. 
6. 22 October 2010 – Indonesia enacts its Anti-Money Laundering law 
(Undang-undang Nomor 8 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pencegahan dan 
Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang 2010), creating 
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PPATK and including terrorism as a predicate offence.
7. June 2012 – Indonesia is included on FATF’s “High Risk and non-
Cooperative Jurisdictions” list (FATF 2012, p. 30)
8. 13 March 2013 – Indonesia enacts the Prevention and Eradication 
of Terrorism Financing Act (Law Number 9 of 2013 (the Act). 
Following the Bali bombing of October 2002, Indonesia hastily 
enacted the Eradication of Terrorism Act, contained in Interim Law No.1 
of 2002. (Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan 
PERPU Nomor 1 2002 Tentang Pemberantasan Terorisme, Menjadi 
Undung-Undang 2003). A detailed discussion of this law, Indonesia’s 
general anti-terrorism legislation –first enacted using the President’s 
emergency powers and subsequently ratified by Parliament – is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However it is worth noting that the 2003 law 
contains one section specifically devoted to criminalising the financing 
of terrorism. Article 11 states:
Any person who wilfully provides or collects funds with the 
intention that they be used, or ought reasonably suspect that they will 
be used in whole or in part for the commission of a terrorist act as set 
out in Articles 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 is subject to a punishment of between 3 
and 15 years imprisonment. (PERPU Nomor 1 2002 Tentang Pember-
antasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme 2002, p. 4 Article 11)
Article 29 also empowers investigators, prosecutors and judges to 
order banks and other financial institutions to immediately freeze the 
assets/property (harta kekayaan) of any person, where it is known or 
suspected that they are the result (hasil) of a terrorist act and/or a crime 
connected with terrorism. The assets/property are ordered to remain in 
the bank. A penalty for non-compliance is to be provided under separate 
regulations. 
Questions about the specific detail of these sections arise, for 
example, why Article 11 refers to funds (dana), whereas Article 29 
refers to assets/property (harta kekayaan). It is noteworthy that Article 
29 does not provide for any judicial review of this power, which may 
be equally used by police investigators, prosecutors and judges alike. 
Neither the duration of the asset freezing nor an appeals process by the 
asset owner is stipulated. No evidence appears to exist as to whether the 
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asset freezing act has been judicially examined, or indeed whether the 
power was ever even used by authorities. 
In any event, by October 2002, Indonesia had complied with its 
international CFT obligations to the extent that it had criminalised the 
act of financing terrorism, and provided a mechanism by which the 
assets/property known or suspected to be the result of a terrorist act 
or a crime connected with terrorism could be blocked or ‘frozen’. (In 
Indonesian the term “pemblokiran” literally “blocking” is used to mean 
freezing. Both terms are used here interchangeably.)
These two relatively brief sections, part of a hastily drafted response 
to a catastrophic terrorist attack, essentially formed the extent of 
Indonesia’s CFT regime for almost a decade. According to a PPATK 
representative, since 2003 there have been 15 prosecutions of terrorism 
funding using Article 11 (Ramadhan 2013). Among the most notable 
cases was the 2011 trial of radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir who was 
convicted of financing a terrorist training camp in Aceh and sentenced 
to 15 years imprisonment (AAP 2011). Another exception is the case 
of Abdul Haris, who in 2011 was convicted of collecting funds for the 
Aceh training camp and sentenced to nine years imprisonment (Pangga-
bean 2011). Most recently three people were convicted of committing 
internet fraud and using the funds to finance a terrorist training camp in 
Poso, Central Sulawesi (Ramadhan 2013).
After the enactment of the 2002 anti-terrorism law, no further 
developments occurred in relation to CFT until 2006, when Indonesia 
officially ratified the Convention by Act of Parliament. However, this 
Act alone is not sufficient to place the Convention on an equal footing 
with other national legislation. A further Act was required, which did 
not occur until 2013. The only other CFT-related development came 
in 2010 with the enactment of the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law 
Number 8 of 2010) (Undang-undang Nomor 8 Tahun 2010 Tentang 
Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang 
2010). While there are some areas of overlap between the anti-money 
laundering law and CFT, the two are distinctly different phenomena. 
Money laundering concerns the act of concealing the illicit origin of 
funds of crime. CFT is concerned with preventing funds of any kind, 
licit or illicit, from making its way into the hands of terrorists. 
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Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts to date have focussed on 
enforcement – that is, capturing and prosecuting terrorist suspects. 
Indonesia’s special counter-terrorism police detachment, Densus 88, 
has garnered international praise for their bravery and success in their 
CT operations; having, at last count, apprehended over 700 suspects 
over the past decade(Post 2013). In fact, while the Indonesian police 
have been praised for their “extraordinary success” (Fealy 2013, 
p. 1) in combating terrorism – police and the government have both 
been criticised for having done, and achieved, much less in the area 
of prevention – Vice President Boediono has been quoted as saying 
that “there has been too much emphasis on repressive actions and not 
enough on preventative” (Sihaloho 2012). If that is the case for the 
general prevention of terrorism, then it is doubly true for the prevention 
of the financing of terrorism. 
In considering the relatively little commentary on CFT regimes, 
McCulloch suggests that it may be due to a perception that CFT laws 
‘are relatively benign, compared to, for example, interrogation/detention 
regimes...It is possible that the sheer volume of national and international 
security measures and legislation passed post-9/11 has meant that the 
suppression of financing of terrorism measures have passed relatively 
undetected in the camouflage of the many other measures that add to 
the arsenal of the state’s coercive powers.’ (McCulloch 2006, p. 397) 
In Indonesia’s post-dictatorship era much more critical attention 
has been given to sections of the anti-terrorism laws which provide 
police with greater powers of arrest and detention, than to CFT issues. 
Apart from some media reporting when the Act was passed in March, 
2013 there has been very little public forum discussion of CFT issues. 
Indeed it would appear that it has been a deliberate policy of PPATK to 
not draw public attention to the CFT laws, for fear of challenge in the 
Constitutional Court (Ramadhan 2013). 
One exception is a governmental report entitled “The Final Report 
of the Academic Team on the Draft Law for the Prevention and 
Eradication of Terrorism Financing” (BPHN 2012), issued in 2012 
in advance of the enactment of the Act. Prepared by the Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights’ Centre for Planning and Legal Development 
in conjunction with representatives from various government agencies 
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including the National Police, the Indonesian Central Bank (BI) and 
PPATK, the 96-page Report was intended as a background paper and 
resource for lawmakers when considering the draft version of the Act. 
The Report echoes the sentiment that while much has been done by 
government agencies in the area of investigating and capturing terrorist 
suspects, less has been done in the area of prevention:
The government’s efforts so far to eradicate terrorism have been 
satisfactory. Although, it has been limited to capturing suspects and 
has given less attention to elements of funding, which are a crucial 
element of any terrorist act...Efforts to eradicate terrorism through 
conventional methods (“follow the suspect”) that is, by capturing and 
punishing terrorists, is not sufficient for preventing and eradicating 
terrorism. Other efforts are required...by applying a “follow the money” 
approach which involves the PPATK, Financial Services Providers and 
law enforcement agencies to detect the flow of funds which are used or 
suspected of being used to fund terrorism (Husein 2012, p. 2).
It goes on to explain however, in repeated references to both the 
Convention and FATF IX Special Recommendations that:
Having ratified the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism by virtue of Law Number 6 of 2006, 
Indonesia is therefore obliged to create or harmonise its legislation 
relating to terrorism financing so that it is in line with the provisions 
in the Convention...The existing legislation relating to terrorism 
financing has not yet dealt with the prevention or eradication of the 
crime of terrorism financing in a satisfactory or comprehensive way...
ratifying a convention is not sufficient for it to become operational, 
this requires a further action. The Prevention and Eradication of 
Terrorism Financing Bill represents the effort to follow up on the 
ratification of the Convention...with its enactment it will form a part 
of Indonesia’s positive law equal to other national legislation...
The need for counter terrorism financing to be dealt with in its own 
legislation is also triggered by the IX Special Recommendations of 
the FATF. These recommendations form the international standard 
for blocking access by terrorist groups and their supporters to the 
financial system (Husein 2012, p. 3).
Given that the Report is firmly based on Convention and IX Special 
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Recommendations principles, it is no surprise that the Act itself is very 
much in line with those provisions, and in many cases mirrors the 
provisions themselves.
The Report in some ways attempts to justify Indonesia’s failure 
to fully implement the Convention’s provisions by arguing that the 
existing, minimal provisions in the then existing CFT legislation are 
effectively sufficient to cover its obligations. It also points out that 
since 2008 PPATK and the Central Bank have been publishing and 
implementing the UN’s consolidated list of terrorist individuals and 
groups to assist financial services providers in detecting and reporting 
suspicious transactions. It adds that from 2008 to 2010 PPATK found 
128 transactions suspected of being connected to terrorism. Further, 
35 suspicious financial transactions were reported to law enforcement 
agencies (Husein 2012, p. 20). 
The Report argues that “having already accommodated the obligations 
on State Parties as set out in the SFT Convention, the ratification or 
enactment of the Convention by the Indonesian government tends more 
towards strengthening or confirming that commitment...Nonetheless, 
ratifying or enacting the convention is very important in strengthening 
Indonesia’s anti-money laundering regime”(Husein 2012, p. 20).
Whether or not this is really the case, it can now be said that 
Indonesia’s domestic legislation is largely, albeit not yet completely, 
in line with international best practices and its obligations under the 
Convention. Whether this legislative conformity will translate into 
greater detection and prevention in practice is an issue outside the scope 
of this paper. In light of the critical importance of the Act to Indonesia’s 
CFT regime, the Act’s salient features warrant attention here. 
Preamble
The Preamble of the Act defers to the 1945 Constitution (Undang 
Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945) as the basis of the 
state’s duty to ensure the security and prosperity of the people. It 
states that in implementing and participating in a world order based 
on independence, peace and social justice’ the state must take firm 
action against any threats which disrupt the security of the people or the 
sovereignty of the state, including terrorism and any activities which 
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support terrorism. Paragraph (b) states that financing is an essential 
element of terrorist acts and therefore any efforts to combat it must 
include the prevention of the financing of terrorism. 
Paragraph (c) refers to Indonesia’s ratification of the Convention, 
and that Indonesia is therefore obliged to harmonise its domestic 
legislation with the provisions as set out in the Convention. The 
fact that Indonesia has ratified the Convention and here, expressly 
acknowledges the requirement to enact the provisions in its national 
legislation effectively deals with the first FATF recommendation that 
“each country take immediate steps to ratify and implement fully the 
1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing” as 
well as the UN resolutions, particularly Resolution 1373. 
Paragraph (d) acknowledges that the legislation dealing with CFT 
has not yet dealt with the prevention and eradication of terrorism 
financing satisfactorily and comprehensively.
Chapter I – Definitions
Terrorism financing is defined in Article (1)(1) in terms similar to 
the Convention as “any act of providing, collecting, giving or loan-
ing funds, whether directly or indirectly, with the intention that they be 
used, or in the knowledge that they will be used, for a terrorist act, a 
terrorist organisation or a terrorist individual.” Convention Article 2(1) 
makes no reference to “loaning” of funds, hence this definition is wider 
and would catch that circumstance if it were ever to be raised as a de-
fence. The Indonesian definition has dropped the phrasing “in full or in 
part”. It is not made clear why this was done, and effectively leaves the 
door open to a defence along the lines of “only a small percentage of the 
funds we collected were used for terrorism.” For the sake of complete-
ness it would be preferable for “loaning” to be inserted. 
It should also be noted here that as discussed above, pursuant to 
Resolution 1373, each country has been tasked with compiling its own 
list of terrorist individuals and organisations, and the Act contains pro-
visions to that effect.
Paragraph (2) of the Act defines a “terrorist act” by reference to the 
general anti-terrorism legislation. Law No.15 2003 Article 6 creates the 
crime of terrorism and effectively defines a terrorist act as being when: 
Forbidden funds – Indonesia’s new legislation for countering the financing of terrorism
380 Volume 11 Number 3 April 2014
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
“any person intentionally uses violence or the threat of violence to cre-
ate a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear or which causes mass 
casualties by taking the liberty or lives and property of any person, or 
which causes damage or destruction to vital strategic objects or the 
environment or public facilities or international facilities.” 
By comparison, as discussed above, the Convention’s definition of 
a terrorist act is two-part, and refers to (a) any acts contained in the 12 
terrorism conventions and (b) any act intended to cause death or serious 
injury to a civilian where the purpose is to intimidate a population or to 
compel a government or other organisation to do or abstain from doing 
any act. 
While the wording of the Indonesian definition is unusual by its ref-
erence to the creation of mass casualties through the taking of liberty, 
lives and property, its references to damage and destruction of property, 
strategic vital facilities, and the environment arguably make it far wider 
than that in the Convention. Whereas the Convention requires an act 
intended to cause death or serious injury, the Act requires, taken at its 
most minimal interpretation, merely an act which causes a widespread 
atmosphere of fear by intending or threatening to cause damage to the 
environment or some public facility. As Butt argues:
Critical terms such as ‘widespread atmosphere of terror or fear’, 
‘mass casualties’ and ‘very high’ are not defined. This leaves 
them open to subjective interpretation and raises many questions 
about how these provisions could be applied...Would terror or 
fear instilled in most inhabitants of one village suffice, or must the 
terror spread through a sub-district, province or, indeed, the whole 
of Indonesia? How is the terror/fear to be proven? Must a poll be 
taken or witnesses called; or would judges accept that fear had in 
fact occurred based on their own perceptions? (Butt 2008, p. 4)
The author is not aware of any cases where this has been raised 
as an issue of contention; a definitive answer would require a detailed 
examination of the available judgments in terrorism cases. The question 
however is a real one, and could arguably be raised as a defence. As 
noted by Jones in relation to many recent cases of shootings of police 
officers “It used to be that jihadis saw the creation of fear as a very 
specific objective...The aim now is much more instrumental. It’s about 
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getting weapons, taking revenge, and giving militants something to do...
The main aim of killing police is certainly not to create fear.” (Jones 
2013, p. 1) Yet these shootings of police officers (five in August and 
September 2013) continue to be labelled terrorist acts, due to alleged 
connections to terrorist groups (Gatra 2013). 
Paragraph (3) expressly defines “persons” to include corporations 
and (4) defines corporations as including “a collection of people and/
or assets whether legal entities or non-legal entities”. This definition of 
a terrorist group or organisation is an improvement on the definition in 
Interim Law No.1 of 2002 – which doesn’t refer to “groups of people” 
only legal or non-legal bodies. Arguably this wider definition of a 
“corporation” is wide enough to capture clandestine terrorist groups 
and networks. However, in terms of listing Indonesian terrorist groups, 
while there are a great number of different groups with different names, 
there is also a high level of permeability between the groups, in respect of 
assisting or harbouring other group members, exchanging information, 
strategies, funds and skills. This ‘blurring of the lines’ between terrorist 
groups potentially creates a hurdle for police who are responsible for 
maintaining the list of terrorist organisations. 
Paragraph (6) defines a “suspicious transaction related to terrorism 
financing” in two parts, namely, (a) a financial transaction where there 
is an intention to be used and/or where it is known that it will be used 
for terrorist acts; or (b) transactions involving any person on the list 
of suspected terrorists or terrorist organisations. The definition of 
“suspicious transaction” will be of essential importance to those in the 
financial services industry, for it is such transactions that employees 
are required to report within three days of becoming aware of them. 
In the absence of an admission or incriminating statement from a 
customer, it is difficult to imagine how a bank employee could establish 
that a transaction was intended or known to be used for terrorism. In 
the absence of such an admission therefore it would arguably be very 
difficult to prove that a financial services provider6 had failed to report 
6  The explanatory notes to the Act list a number of examples of Financial Services 
Providers (FSPs) including, among others: banks, financial institutions, insurance 
companies and insurance brokers, pension funds, securities companies, investment 
managers, custodians, trustees, postal service providers, foreign exchange traders, 
credit card companies, e-money or e-wallet providers, savings and loans societies or 
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a suspicious transaction on this basis. A more likely situation is failure 
by the provider employee to check a current list for a listed individual 
or organisation, and the transaction has proceeded. Considering the 
enormous volume of daily transactions, it is conceivable, indeed 
probably inevitable that an inestimably large number of transactions will 
proceed without being checked in this manner. It is here that criticisms 
of CFT as being akin to trying to “find a needle in a haystack” come 
to the fore. Barrett for example speaks of the “the near impossibility 
of achieving full compliance with all nine Special Recommendations, 
let alone of assuring effective implementation.” (Barrett 2012) He also 
warns that where a perception of disproportionality seeps in between 
the burden of implementing the laws and the benefits of doing so, those 
implementing them will become less rigorous and those complying 
less caring. This will undoubtedly be an issue faced by both financial 
service providers obligated to implement the CFT checks and PPATK 
tasked with enforcing them. 
Paragraph (9) defines the Financial Transactions Analysis and 
Reporting Centre (PPATK) as that referred to and created by the Anti-
money Laundering Act.
Under Paragraph (10) a Financial Services Provider (FSP) is any 
person providing services in the field of finance or related services 
whether formal or informal. According to Ramadhan this definition 
would include designated non-financial businesses and professions 
(DNFBPs), such as lawyers, which offer any kind of financial service. 
A lawyer who offers only advocacy services, on the other hand, would 
not be included. (Ramadhan 2013) 
A Supervisory and Regulatory Agency (LPP) is one responsible for 
supervision, regulation and sanction of Financial Services Providers. 
The relationship between LPPs and the PPATK is expanded on further 
in the Act. In practice, there are two LPPs – for banks, the relevant 
LPP is Bank Indonesia; Indonesia’s central bank. For non-banks, the 
cooperatives, any companies operating in commodities trading, or money transfer ser-
vices. The Act makes no mention of non-financial businesses and professions such as 
lawyers. According to Syahril Ramadhan this definition is wide enough to cover any 
professions, including lawyers, which offer any kind of financial services (Ramadhan 
2013).
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relevant LPP is the Financial Services Authority (OJK). Whereas the 
PPATK can recommend sanctions against FSPs, it is the relevant LPP 
which will actually make a final determination on the execution of 
sanctions against FSPs (Ramadhan 2013). 
Chapter II – Scope
Chapter II details the extraterritoriality provisions in the Conven-
tion, that is, that the Act may apply within the territory of the Indonesia 
or outside Indonesia in certain cases where there is a nexus with Indo-
nesia. External acts listed include those committed outside Indonesia 
by an Indonesian national, or acts committed against the Indonesian 
government or Indonesian flagged vessels or aircraft. 
Chapter III – the crime of terrorism financing
Article 4 criminalises terrorism financing, providing for a maximum 
penalty of 15 years imprisonment and a maximum fine of Rp1 billion. 
Article 5 criminalises attempts, conspiracies, or aiding terrorism financ-
ing with the same penalties as Article 4. 
Article 6 states “any person who wilfully plans, organises or incites/
encourages (menggerakkan) others to commit the offence set out in Ar-
ticle 4 commits the offence of terrorism financing with a penalty of life 
imprisonment or a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. This 
section is interesting - firstly it provides two seemingly contradictory 
penalties, i.e. life imprisonment or a maximum of 20 years. Secondly 
the penalty here for planning, organising or inciting is harsher than the 
penalty in Article 4, and arguably far wider in scope. It is conceivable 
that the section applies to fiery speeches by Islamist clerics (taklim) 
which include a call to make donations to jihadist groups. Clearly where 
the group was listed this would constitute a crime. Where it is known or 
ought to be known that the funds would be used for a terrorist act, this 
would also constitute a crime under Article 6 and expose the speaker 
to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The penalty’s harshness 
presumably reflects the gravity of the offence for those in positions of 
authority, such as clerics or teachers, to abuse their position by encour-
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aging others to commit the crime of funding terrorism. 
Chapter IV – Other crimes related to terrorist financing
Chapter IV stipulates the potential criminal liabilities of those work-
ing within the terrorism financing regime and financial services provid-
ers. Article 9 (the ‘anti-tipping off’ article) provides that any officer or 
employee of PPATK, investigating or prosecuting agencies, judges, or 
any person receiving documents or information relating to a suspicious 
transaction in the course of their duty is obligated to treat that informa-
tion as secret. Leaking of any such document or information attracts a 
maximum penalty of four years imprisonment. Given the level of cor-
ruption within Indonesia’s criminal justice system, the maximum pen-
alty of four years imprisonment would seem a reasonable deterrent to 
the leaking of such sensitive information. 
Article 10 forbids directors, commissioners, managers or staff of 
a financial services provider or the regulatory agencies from provid-
ing information regarding a suspicious transaction to any customer and 
provides a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and Rp1 billion 
fine. The penalty here is higher as it specifies the giving of information 
to the customer (or any other person). Given the seriousness of the po-
tential consequences of leaking such information to a terrorist organisa-
tion it may be asked whether the penalty should not be even higher.
Chapter V – Prevention
Chapter V sets out provisions relating to prevention of CFT, with 
Article 11 setting out four mechanisms by which prevention may be 
achieved. They are: (a) application of the principle of ‘know your cus-
tomer’ (b) adherence to monitoring and reporting by FSPs (c) monitor-
ing of money transfer systems and (d) monitoring the movement of 
cash in and out of Indonesia. 
Article 13 on “Reporting” is one which would perhaps cause most 
concern for those working in the financial services industry and re-
quires any provider to report any financial transaction suspected of be-
ing connected to the financing of terrorism within three days of becom-
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ing aware of the transaction. Subsection (2) however softens the impact 
of the preceding section by stating that where a provider “intentionally” 
contravenes the section it may incur an administrative fine of up to Rp1 
billion rupiah. This fine is to be administered by the LPP. 
Articles 14-17 outline the legal framework for the monitoring and 
compliance with the reporting requirements. Monitoring and compli-
ance is to be carried out by LPPs in cooperation with PPATK. Where 
an LPP discovers a suspicious transaction that has not been reported to 
PPATK, the LPP must immediately report this discovery to PPATK. 
Reports of suspicious transactions to PPATK are specifically ex-
empted from confidentiality provisions which providers are usually 
bound by. And except in cases of abuses of process provider staff will 
not be liable for any criminal or civil action in carrying out their duties 
in accordance with Act. 
Articles 18, 19 and 20 set out the conditions for money transfers, 
including requirements for full details to be obtained with regard to 
both the sender and receiver of funds. Without those the transfer must 
be rejected. providers are also required to store details from all money 
transfers for at least five years from the date of the transfer. In the event 
of non-compliance providers will be liable to a sanction to be set out in 
further regulations, which are yet to be issued. 
Chapter VI – Blocking (Freezing)
Chapter VI stipulates the regime by which PPATK, investigators, 
prosecutors or judges may request or order a provider to block or freeze 
assets where it is known, or ought to be known that the funds will 
be used for terrorism. It should be noted that the regime provided in 
Chapter VI is significantly different from that set out in article 29 of 
interim law No. 1 of 2002. The main difference is that this new regime 
provides for judicial oversight of the power to block or freeze assets 
or funds. The regime set out here expressly supersedes and repeals the 
provisions of article 29 of the ATL.
Article 22 sets out that a freeze may be executed where it is known or 
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suspected7 that funds will be used for terrorism. Articles 23 through 26 
then go on to set out the procedure by which a freeze may be requested, 
executed and objected to. Under article 23(1) a request for a freeze on 
funds may originate from the PPATK, an investigator, a prosecutor, or 
a judge – and must be set out in writing in a letter of request to the FSP. 
This is expressly “an administrative request” and it must set out the 
name and position of the person requesting the freeze, the identity of 
the corporation or person whose funds are being blocked, the reasons 
for the request and the location of the funds. 
Article 23(2) sets out a parallel mechanism by which a court order 
may be sought from the Central Jakarta District Court – but does not 
provide further details.8 In either case, article 23(5) requires FSPs 
to execute a block immediately after receiving a letter of request or 
an order – the block then remains in force for 30 days – and the FSP 
must provide a notice of compliance with the block to the requesting 
agency, and the party whose funds have been blocked, within one day. 
The blocked funds must remain with the FSP. After 30 days the FSP is 
then required to terminate the block on the funds. This would appear to 
contradict FATF Best Practices which require a block of “indeterminate 
duration” (FATF 2013b, p. 6). 
Articles 24 to 26 set out a procedure for objecting against a block 
by the holder of the funds. This may be done by lodging a notice of 
objection within 14 days with PPATK, investigator, prosecutor or 
judge, i.e. the party which requested the block. The notice must include 
the reasons for the objection and be accompanied by any relevant 
documentary evidence which may explain the legitimate origin of 
the funds. In the event of a notice of objection the requesting agency 
must either revoke the block or reject the notice of objection. Where 
it is rejected, article 25(6) advises that the blocked party may bring 
a civil action in court. It appears unclear how the two mechanisms 
of an administrative request and a court order work together. In what 
circumstances should a requesting agency seek a court order and when 
7  The explanatory note to this section sets out that the standard of proof in this 
instance is that of bukti permulaan yang cukup, sufficient preliminary or ‘prima 
facie evidence’. 
8  This “dual” mechanism of administrative and judicial proceedings accord with the 
process outlined in the FATF best practices document (FATF 2013b, p. 5)
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would it use an administrative request? Secondly, it seems potentially 
inequitable that an objection to a block on funds should be made to the 
same agency which sought the block. 
Chapter VII – List of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisations 
issued by government
Chapter VII, articles 27 to 35, outlines the procedure for issuing a 
list of terrorist organisations, the blocking of funds of listed persons 
or organisations, and a procedure for objecting. In brief, the Chief of 
the Indonesian Police shall submit an application to the Central Jakar-
ta District Court of suspected terrorist individuals and organisations. 
Identities and reasons must be included as well as any documentary 
evidence or recommendations from relevant government departments 
or ministries9. The Court must then make a determination on the ap-
plication within 30 days. Where the court grants the request, the name 
of the person or organisation is included on the list, and the person or 
organisation must be notified within 10 days. The list is maintained 
by the Chief of Police. As at September 2013, such a list had yet to be 
issued – forming one of FATF’s main concerns about Indonesia’s non-
compliance. 
The list is then forwarded, via the LPPs’ to all financial services pro-
viders who are required to block all funds belonging to those persons 
or groups. The blocked parties may object providing reasons and docu-
ments to the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police must then determine 
whether to remove the person from the list, or reject the application; in 
which case the party may bring an action in the Central Jakarta District 
Court. 
Remaining Chapters
Chapter VIII sets out a procedure for law enforcement agencies to 
request information relating to funds from FSPs. Chapter IX relates 
9  The explanatory note for article 27 mentions agencies such as the National Counter 
Terrorism Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Intelligence 
Agency.
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to international cooperation including requests from foreign agencies 
for freezing of funds of terrorist organisations within Indonesia. Under 
Chapter IX a request for the freezing of assets of a person originates 
from an overseas jurisdiction and is forwarded to the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. This request is then forwarded to the Chief of Police, and on 
to the Central Jakarta District Court in a process similar to that con-
tained in Chapter VI. Chapters X and XI are administrative covering 
transitional arrangements and repealing previous legislation. 
IV. CRITICISMS OF INDONESIA’S CFT REGIME 
In evaluating Indonesia’s CFT legislative regime, it can be argued 
that Indonesia has fulfilled its obligations under the Convention. All 
of the major requirements of the Convention are met, namely funding 
of terrorism is criminalised with serious penalties; a regime exists for 
the designation of terrorist groups and the freezing of their assets; laws 
exist requiring FSPs to apply “know your customer” principles and 
to report suspicious transactions; procedures exist for extradition and 
international cooperation in CFT – and so on. 
However, according to FATF, Indonesia has not gone far enough 
(Posthouwer 2008, p. 161). And while these recommendations are not 
binding on countries, being on the FATF’s list of high-risk and non-
compliant jurisdictions can provide a powerful incentive to act. 
In a statement posted on 21 June 2013, FATF stated:
Indonesia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, 
including by adequately criminalising terrorist financing through 
the CFT law enacted in February 2013. However, despite Indone-
sia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and 
APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Indonesia has 
not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan within 
the agreed timelines, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies 
remain regarding the establishment and implementation of an ad-
equate legal framework and procedures for identifying and freezing 
of terrorist assets. The FATF encourages Indonesia to address these 
remaining issues, in compliance with international standards.
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It is clear that significant progress has been made by Indonesia, 
driven by high-level political commitment; however more work needs 
to be done in the area of implementation. 
PPATK representative Syahril Ramadhan confirmed these 
comments saying that the FATF’s concerns could be divided into three 
areas: Indonesia’s failure to create a domestic list of terrorism financers; 
freezing assets of individuals on the Resolution 1267 list “without 
delay”; and the evidentiary standards applied by Indonesian courts 
when determining whether to include a person on the domestic list (Ra-
madhan 2013). 
Whereas the legal framework for the creation of a list of suspect-
ed terrorist financers now exists, pursuant to Chapter VI of the Act, in 
practice, this list has not yet been compiled or issued by the Indonesian 
Chief of Police. However this is merely a question of time and imple-
mentation. The PPATK is currently in discussions with the police’s spe-
cial counter terrorism unit, Densus 88, and it appears that a domestic 
list will be issued within a matter of months (Ramadhan 2013). In the 
opinion of Mr Ramadhan, the issuance of that list, which will merge 
both a domestic list and the Resolution 1267 list, will be sufficient for 
Indonesia to be removed from the FATF’s list of high risk and non-
cooperative jurisdictions. 
Notwithstanding the creation of such a list, FATF has flagged two 
further issues related to Indonesia’s judicial oversight menchanism. 
First, that the freezing of assets of individuals on the 1267 list must 
be conducted “without delay” and the judicial oversight mechanism 
provides a lag time of up to 30 days during which a court considers 
whether to list the person or not. Second, FATF has requested further 
information regarding the evidentiary standards used by Indonesian 
courts in making such a determination (Ramadhan 2013). In relation 
to the second issue, FATF’s International Best Practices document, 
explains that in making determinations of whether individuals should 
be listed “the competent authority of each jurisdiction will apply the 
legal standards of its own legal system regarding the kind and quantum 
of evidence...to enhance and expedite cooperation...all countries are 
encouraged to share information on how the legal standard is applied...
with examples.” (FATF 2013b, p. 6) Given the relative newness of In-
Forbidden funds – Indonesia’s new legislation for countering the financing of terrorism
390 Volume 11 Number 3 April 2014
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
donesia’s CFT legislation there are currently no decided cases for In-
donesian authorities to share with other jurisidictions. However, as at 
the time of writing, the first case to seek a designation using the new 
legislation is before the courts and will be decided within a matter of 
weeks. (Ramadhan 2013) Indonesian CFT authorities would be advised 
therefore to take note of the court’s decision and the evidence present-
ed, and share this information, with their international counterparts; in 
line with FATF’s guidance.
Regarding the delays inherent in Indonesia’s judicial oversight 
mechanism it would appear that there are two competing policy objec-
tives at stake – on one hand is the expedient freezing of assets of sus-
pected terrorist financers before they are able to be withdrawn or moved 
– on the other are notions of due process and fairness. 10 
Indeed, FATF’s International Best Practices document which 
is intended to “assist countries in developing and implementing” 
financial sanctions regimes refers to both of these competing policy 
objectives. It stresses that “efforts to combat terrorist financing are 
greatly undermined if countries do not freeze the funds or other assets 
of designated persons and entities quickly and effectively”. (FATF 
2013b, p. 4) However, it also emphasises the importance of following 
established legal guidelines, the rule of law and due process. 
Yunus Husein, Chairman of the committee which authored the draft 
CFT Bill Report, and former head of PPATK, criticised the Act for that 
reason. In discussing the mechanism contained in Articles 27 and 28 he 
pointed out that it would be possible for funds to be moved while this 
process proceeds. (Hukumonline 2013) One alternative, as adopted in 
Malaysia for example, is that the funds of anyone on the 1267 list, are 
automatically frozen (Ramadhan 2013). However, this would require 
an amendment to the Act, and that is unlikely to happen within the life 
of the current parliament, given Indonesia has an election in early 2014. 
While it might seem easy to dismiss concerns related to the 1267 list, 
due to the decreasing relevance of Al Qaida in the years since 9/11, 
Ramadhan has pointed out that in the last month alone, the United States 
10  Further details on the application of Special recommendation 6 can be found in the 
FATF Special Report on International Best Practices Targeted Financial Sanctions 
Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (Recommendation 6) (FATF 2013b)
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has added two Indonesian nationals to the list. Therefore, the list and 
concerns relating to its implementation continue to be regarded as being 
of high importance to FATF, the UN and the United States in particular. 
Another criticism of Indonesia’s ability to implement an effective 
CFT regime focuses on the high numbers and ease of obtaining false 
identification documents (KTPs or Kartu Tanda Penduduk) which 
allow terrorists (and other criminals) to travel, seek accommodation, 
open bank accounts etc using a false identity. As outlined in FATF’s 
Best Practices document “for the effective implementation of an asset 
freeze, robust identifying information is essential” (FATF 2013b, p. 6) 
This factor, combined with the common practice of individuals to use 
only one name, could potentially lead to significant issues in providing 
a positive identity match for a suspected terrorism financer (Nugrah-
anto 2010). However this is obviously an issue outside the control of 
PPATK. 
A reading of Posthouwer’s analysis of the Australian legislative 
regime (Posthouwer 2008) indicates a level of nuanced detail in the 
various regulations and procedures which is not yet present within the 
Indonesian system. For example, AUSTRAC, Australia’s equivalent 
of PPATK, has issued detailed supplementary rules and regulations 
governing the fine details of implementation of “know your customer” 
procedures. However, further regulations will no doubt be forthcoming 
from PPATK to govern the kind of procedural details which are present 
in other jurisdictions. 
PPATK needs to work closely with FATF to further develop the 
detailed regulations and rules required to bring Indonesia into line with 
FATF’s requirements and to be removed from the list of non-compliant 
countries. These regulations would then require a concerted whole-of-
government approach in their application with the full commitment of 
the private financial services sector to implement the principles of KYC 
and suspicious transaction reporting. Only then will Indonesia have any 
chance of being removed from FATF’s list of high-risk countries. 
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V. CONCLUSION
With the enactment, in March 2013, of its Eradication and Pre-
vention of Terrorism Financing Act, Indonesia has finally brought its 
domestic legislation into line with its commitments under the Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing – 12 years 
after signing the Convention. 
However, having been criticised by FATF for failing to implement 
the new laws in line with the agreed timeline, Indonesia remains on 
FATF’s list of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. It may be 
argued that the 2003 law and this latest initiative merely pay lip-service 
to Indonesia’s international commitments in respect of combating the 
financing of terrorism, and that the latest initiative was enacted only in 
response to Indonesia’s inclusion on FATF’s ‘name and shame’ list. On 
the other hand, it may be said that Indonesia has achieved more than 
most in the area of general counter terrorism operations, and while the 
enactment and implementation of its CFT legislation may have lagged 
somewhat, the political will exists, and it is simply a matter of time and 
regulatory detail before the legislation is fully implemented by both 
public and private institutions. 
A truly effective application of the CFT statutory regime will re-
quire accompanying implementing regulations, which have yet to be 
issued. The regulations will require much greater detail in respect of the 
implementation and infrastructural regime, particularly concerning the 
monitoring and application of compliance and sanctions by PPATK and 
the sustained and coordinated efforts of both government agencies and 
the financial services sector. These are all outcome objectives which 
are achievable given the continuing goodwill and cooperation of the 
financial services sector. While it may appear unlikely to be realised in 
the near future, with the enactment of its CFT legislation, a functioning 
counter-terrorist financing regime, capable of satisfying FATF, is now 
within Indonesia’s grasp. 
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